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Labor and Employment Law

by W. Jonathan Martin 11*
F. Damon Kitchen"
and Gary R. Wheeler***
This Article surveys the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit precedent from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2015.
The following is a discussion of those opinions.
I.

SUPREME COURT CASES

The United States Supreme Court issued three decisions affecting
employment law this survey period. First, in Young v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.,' a divided Supreme Court decided that employers covered
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act2 (part of Title VII) may be
required to make reasonable accommodations for work restrictions
caused by pregnancy and related conditions.' Young was a delivery
driver for the United Parcel Service (UPS). Her job required her to
regularly lift packages weighing as much as 70 pounds and move
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1. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (2012).
3. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
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packages weighing up to 150 pounds, albeit with assistance. After
suffering several miscarriages, Young became pregnant and was placed
on a 20-pound lifting restriction (later reduced to 10 pounds). UPS did
not terminate Young's employment, but it did require her to go on an
unpaid medical leave. UPS did not offer accommodations that would
have allowed her to continue working.4
Relying upon the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) new Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues,' Young
argued that an employer must accommodate pregnancy if it accommodates employees with disabilities and must provide light duty for
pregnant employees if it does so for employees with workplace injuries
and illnesses.6
While not specifically adopting-or rejecting-the EEOC's position, the
Court held a pregnant employee can establish a prima facie case of
disparate treatment by showing, under the familiar burden-shifting
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' that: (1) she
belongs to a protected class; (2) she sought an accommodation; (3) the
employer did not accommodate her; and (4) the employer accommodated
others "similar in their ability or inability to work."' The Court also
held the expense or inconvenience of accommodating a pregnant
employee is not a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory" reason for treating the
pregnant employee differently.' While not providing clear guidance, the
message for employers is clear-employers should carefully evaluate
pregnant employees' requests for accommodation.
Second, in Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC,o a unanimous Court held
that conciliation efforts by the EEOC are subject to judicial review on
whether the EEOC met its statutory obligation." Under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 an aggrieved employee is required to file
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC." The EEOC, in turn,
notifies the employer of the charge and will investigate the allega-

4. Id. at 1344.
5.

U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON PREGNANCY

DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES, EEOC NOTICE NO. 915.003 (June 25, 2015),

http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancyguidance.cfin.
6. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344.
7. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
9. Id. (quoting McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802).
10. 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).
11. Id. at 1649.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
13. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1649.
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tions." If the EEOC determines reasonable cause exists, it must
"endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by
If the
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."
informal
these
EEOC does not obtain a conciliation agreement through
methods, it may sue an employer."
In Mach Mining, the employer sought to defend itself from the EEOC
by alleging the EEOC had not conciliated the matter in good faith prior
to filing suit." The Court held that "[t]he appropriate scope of review
enforces" the requirements of Title VII's conciliation provision, "in brief,
that the EEOC afford the employer a chance to discuss and rectify a
specified discriminatory practice."" However, the Court cautioned that
the scope of review was "narrow.""
Third, King v. Burwell2 0 upheld the legality of the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) 2 1 provisions for state and federal exchanges.2 2
II.

A.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF

1964

Substantive DiscriminationClaims

Twenty-five years ago in Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,2 the
Eleventh Circuit held: "[N]o matter how high-handed its decisional
process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, [Title VII] does
not interfere. Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer
gave an honest explanation of its behavior."2 4
25
the Eleventh
In Flowers v. roup County, Georgia School District,
Circuit continued this line of reasoning and expounded upon it." In
Flowers, the head football coach was terminated for allegedly committing
recruiting violations. Flowers claimed that he was terminated because
he was African American and presented two Caucasian head football

14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012)).
16. Id. at 1649-50.
17. Id. at 1650.
18. Id. at 1653.
19. Id. at 1656.
20. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
21. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. 135 S. Ct. at 2493-94.
23. 939 F.2d 1466 (11th Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1470 (quoting Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
25. 803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
26. Id. at 1330.
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coaches who were also suspected of recruiting violations as comparators.
Flowers vehemently denied being involved in any recruiting violation.
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, and
Flowers appealed.2 7
Flowers challenged the district court ruling on three grounds. First,
he argued he never committed the recruiting violations.2 8 Second, he
argued the employer's "shifting and inconsistent explanations" created
an inference or pretext to survive summary judgment.2 9 Finally, he
alleged that sufficient comparators existed to allow a jury to decide the
matter.o
Addressing the first basis of his appeal, the court held it did not
matter if the investigation was unfair, or if the allegations were
completely untrue." The only concern was whether at the time of the
adverse employment action, the school honestly believed that Flowers
was engaged in illegal recruiting for the football team.3 2 Second, the
court held the shifting reasons were not, in and of themselves, a
sufficient basis for denying summary judgment, holding the following:
"Intervening precedent has since closed this avenue for Title VII
plaintiffs. Contradicting [the employer's] asserted reason alone, though
...
highly suggestive of pretext, no longer supports an inference of
unlawful discrimination."" Instead, there must be "other evidence" in
addition to the contrasting reason to create a jury question." Finally,
the Eleventh Circuit rejected Flowers' comparators as no more than
having a "surface-level resemblance."3 '
The court reasoned that
Flowers' conduct was distinguishable from his comparators in the
"intensity and frequency of the recruiting allegations.""
In the same vein, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment
in Powell v. American Remediation & Environmental, Inc.," where an
African-American employee, Powell, was terminated for his suspected
drug use." An employee witnessed Powell and another employee

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1330, 1334, 1335.
1333-34.
1336.
1334.

at 1339.

34. Id. (quoting Kragor v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir.
2012)).

35. Id. at 1340.
36. Id.
37.

618 F. App'x 974 (11th Cir. 2015).

38. Id. at 976.
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"smoking something that 'did not look like a cigarette and did not smell
like a cigarette.'"39 The employer investigated the incident, and the
other employee admitted he and Powell were smoking spice (synthetic
marijuana). Because the perceived conduct was a violation of the
company's drug policy, both employees were terminated.
Powell
requested he be drug tested, but the company refused because there was
a fifty percent chance the synthetic marijuana would not show up in a
drug test.4 0

In his Title VII claim, Powell stated he "was terminated under false
pretenses so his supervisor's relative could be promoted to Powell's
position."4 1 The district court found that although Powell established
a prima facie case for race discrimination, the employer provided a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, which was the well-founded
belief that Powell violated the drug policy. 42 The court concluded the
non-discriminatory reason was not pretext for race discrimination
because "he had offered no evidence that discrimination was the real
reason for his termination."
The court reasoned that even if the real
reason was to allow the supervisor's relative to ascend to a higher
position, nepotism is not unlawful under Title VII, and it does not show
the decision was based on the employee's race." Ultimately, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision.4 5
In Brown v. Bibb County Properties, LLC,46 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the dismissals of Title VII claims brought by five AfricanAmerican employees based on race discrimination."
These five
employees claimed their Hispanic supervisor was discriminating against
them by awarding overtime to Hispanic employees over the AfricanAmerican employees. 4 8 However, the court held the employees failed
to prove they were qualified to work overtime, which required a special
set of skills.4 ' The supervisor based the assignment of overtime hours
on a number of factors, including the "employee's reliability, performance, and willingness to work overtime in the past."o All of these

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

975.
975-76.
976 (quoting the complaint).
976-77.
977.

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 979.
602 F. App'x 755 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 757-58.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
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factors, along with the skill-set required, could have been non-discriminatory reasons as to why the Hispanic workers were receiving the
overtime instead of the African-American workers, and the employees
did not present evidence to the contrary."
In Hamilton v. Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc.,` the Eleventh Circuit, in
a per curiam opinion, affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Sheridan Healthcorp." Hamilton, an anesthesiologist who worked for the defendant, brought Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims against Sheridan Healthcorp after he was
transferred to the night shift and then terminated."
On appeal,
Hamilton contended he had provided sufficient evidence to establish that
his transfer to the night shift was racially motivated and argued his
supervisor's statement that he "lacked confidence that [Hamilton] could
be 'the face of the department at night"' was evidence of discriminatory
intent." The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and ruled that in the absence
of a comparator for his transfer and termination, which Hamilton had
not identified, the statement he attributed to his supervisor was
insufficient circumstantial evidence of racially discriminatory intent. 6
In addition to appealing his race discrimination claim, Hamilton also
appealed the district court's award of summary judgment regarding his
However, the Eleventh Circuit held there was no
retaliation claim.
evidence showing Hamilton had engaged in any protected activity prior
to his termination." Specifically, the court concluded he had not
engaged in any protected opposition clause activity because he admitted
in his deposition that he had not complained to anyone about his
transfer." Likewise, the court held Hamilton had not engaged in any
protected participation clause activity because he had never filed a
charge of discrimination, nor had he participated in any investigation or
proceeding under Title VII, prior to his termination.60
In Willis v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.,61 the Eleventh Circuit once
again issued a per curiam opinion affirming the district court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant after determining that

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
602 F. App'x 485 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 489.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id.
619 F. App'x 960 (11th Cir. 2015).
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Willis had failed to establish a prima facie case of either racial
discrimination or retaliation under Title VII. 62 Willis brought Title VII
claims of race discrimination and retaliation against Publix after he was
terminated by Publix for dishonesty. Willis argued, both before the
district court and on appeal, that he was actually terminated because he
was African American and because he complained of not receiving proper
training and being passed over for promotional opportunities."
However, because Willis failed to offer proof that any other employees
not in his protected class had similarly violated Publix's dishonesty
policy but had not been terminated, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of his race discrimination claims due to the lack
of a proper comparator.6 4
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Willis' retaliation claims because he failed to
allege that his complaints to management about not receiving proper
training and being passed over for promotion were based on an unlawful
employment practice such as discrimination.65 Accordingly, the court
held Willis failed to establish that he had engaged in statutorilyprotected activity.66 The court further noted even if Willis had established he engaged in protected activity, he had still failed to establish
any causal connection between his protected activity and his termination
because he had not shown that any of Publix's decision-makers were
aware of his protected activity at the time they terminated his employment.
B.

ProceduralIssues

68
In Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Foundation,
Surtain filed claims
against Hamlin Terrace Foundation for race and disability discrimination, as well as interference and retaliation claims under the Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)." Hamlin did not respond to the claims, so
Surtain obtained an entry of default and motioned the court for default
judgment on all the claims. However, the district court refused to grant
the default judgment on the grounds that the complaint did not make
out a prima facie case for the claims alleged. Surtain amended her
complaint and again moved for a default judgment when Hamlin failed

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 962.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
Id.
Id.
Id.
789 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2015).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
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to file a responsive pleading. The district court once more refused to
grant the default judgment, and instead ordered Surtain to serve a
second amended complaint on Hamlin. After Surtain served Hamlin
with her second amended complaint, and Hamlin again failed to take
any defensive action in response thereto, Surtain filed a third motion for
default judgment. However, instead of granting Surtain's motion for
default judgment, the district court dismissed her claims with prejudice.o
On appeal, Surtain argued the district court erred in refusing to grant
her a default judgment, and the dismissal of her claims was a procedural
error because Surtain was not afforded the proper notice of any pleading
deficiencies before her claims were dismissed.7 " The Eleventh Circuit
noted that the court reviews the denial of motions for default judgment
under the abuse of discretion standard, and that an abuse of discretion
occurs when a district court applies an incorrect legal standard. 72 The
court then noted that the appropriate legal standard to be applied to a
motion for default judgment is "whether the plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief." 7
The Eleventh Circuit concluded the district court applied the incorrect
legal standard regarding Surtain's race discrimination claim because it
had applied the prima facie case standard under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green,74 as opposed to the plausibility standard.7 ' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held the district court had abused its discretion
and vacated and remanded that claim to the district court for reconsideration under the plausibility standard.7 ' As for her disability discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the
Eleventh Circuit again determined the district court had applied the
wrong standard.7 ' Nevertheless, the court held even under the
plausibility standard, Surtain's second amended complaint did not state
a claim for disability discrimination.7 ' Accordingly, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that Surtain was not entitled to default judgment on her
disability claim.80 Lastly, on her FMLA claims of interference and

70. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1243, 1244.
71. Id. at 1244.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1246.
74. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
75. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246.
76. Id.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
78. Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246.
79. Id. at 1246-47.
80. Id. at 1247.
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retaliation, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Surtain's second amended
complaint contained "insufficient allegations to state a plausible claim
under the FMLA, [and that] the District Court correctly denied her
motion for default judgment on that ground."" Surtain had simply
made conclusory statements in her pleading rather than relaying facts
pertaining to the elements of the claim.82
Surtain also argued on appeal that the district court had committed
a procedural error in dismissing her claims without first providing notice
that her second amended complaint was deficiently pled." The
Eleventh Circuit observed that in light of its disposition of the appeal,
the court only needed to address Surtain's claims of procedural error
with respect to her ADA and FMLA claims." The court then opined
the proper notice required prior to dismissal is the intent to dismiss and
an opportunity to respond." However, the court also noted that an
exception to this requirement exists when amending the complaint would
be futile or when the complaint is patently frivolous." The court held
although the district court had given Surtain sufficient notice that her
race and disability claims were deficient, and she had been provided the
opportunity to amend those claims, the district court had not similarly
provided Surtain with adequate notice that her FMLA claims were
deficient." The Eleventh Circuit held the district court's failure to
provide adequate notice would not salvage Surtain's FMLA retaliation
claim because that claim was futile due to a lack of any retaliatory
conduct by the employer." However, it determined that Surtain's
FMLA interference claim was neither patently frivolous nor futile
because she sufficiently pled facts that showed Hamlin may have "failed
to provide sufficient information for Surtain to fill out her FMLA
paperwork."" Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court
erred in dismissing that claim without first giving Surtain an opportunity to amend it."o

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1248.
1247-48.
1244.
1248.
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AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

In Liebman v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," the Eleventh Circuit
examined whether a plaintiff bringing suit under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 92 had satisfied the elements of a
prima facie case of age discrimination.13 Liebman, an employee of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) for twenty-seven years,
brought an ADEA claim against his employer after MetLife terminated
him in December 2012. At the time of his termination, Liebman was
forty-nine years old. The district court granted summary judgment for
MetLife after determining Liebman was unable to establish a prima
facie case of age discrimination.94 On appeal, however, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the district court for
reconsideration."
Liebman began working for MetLife as a salesman in 1985. Liebman
worked his way up through the ranks to the position of managing
director of two MetLife South Florida offices. Liebman began having
work performance issues in 2008. His new supervisor, Adkins, gave him
poor performance evaluations and placed him on a performance
improvement plan. However, Liebman claimed these bad reviews were
a result of Adkins' jealousy over Liebman's superior pension plan.
Liebman's performance issues improved in 2009, when he was placed
under a different supervisor." Although Liebman's office performed
well, in 2011 an external consultant was hired to determine how MetLife
could improve sales and concluded Liebman was "egocentric" and not the
real reason for his office's recent success." Liebman's success waned
in 2012 after MetLife cut costs and restructured, and one of his top
salesmen had a drop in sales that caused Liebman to have a poor sales
year. In October 2012, MetLife decreased Liebman's pay by ten percent
per week. Shortly thereafter, in December 2012, MetLife notified
Liebman that it was eliminating his position."
To establish a prima facie claim of age discrimination under the
ADEA, Liebman had to prove the following: (1) he was a member of a
protected group aged forty, or older; (2) he was subject to an adverse

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

808 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015).
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1298.
Id. at 1296-99.
Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1296, 1297.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
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employment action; (3) a substantially younger person filled the position
from which he was discharged; and (4) he was qualified to do the job
from which he was discharged." The district court concluded Liebman
had not satisfied the third and fourth elements of his prima facie
burden. As to the third element, the district court found Liebman's
forty-two year old replacement, Weiss, was also a member of the
protected age class who was not "substantially younger" than Liebman.
The district court further concluded Liebman had not satisfied the fourth
element of his prima facie case because he could not prove he was
qualified to perform the job from which he had been fired.' 0
In evaluating whether Liebman had satisfied the elements of a prima
facie claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, the Eleventh Circuit
disagreed with the district court.' 0 ' The court held that even though
Weiss was over forty, the fact that he was seven years younger than
Liebman made him "substantially younger" than Liebman. 02 The
court also disagreed with the district court on whether Liebman was
qualified for his job.'s The Eleventh Circuit held Liebman's twentyseven years of experience, almost nine of which he spent performing
managerial job duties, qualified him for his position."0 ' Therefore, the
court of appeals vacated the award of summary judgment and remanded
the case back to the district court.'0 5
IV.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp.,' the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment to an employer accused
of violating both the ADA and the FMLA.'o' The plaintiff, Jarvela, a
former employee of a Georgia-based trucking company, Crete, had been
diagnosed with alcohol dependence after a stay in a substance abuse
treatment center. Crete terminated Jarvela a week after his diagnosis.
After his termination, Jarvela sued Crete claiming the termination of his
employment violated the ADA and both the interference and retaliation
provisions of the FMLA based on Crete's failure to reinstate him

99.
100.

Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1298, 1299.

101. Id.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id. at 1300.
776 F.3d 822 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 825.
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following the conclusion of his company-approved leave to care for his
serious health condition. 1o
During the district court proceedings, Crete filed, and the district court
granted, a motion for summary judgment on all of Jarvela's claims. In
support of its motion for summary judgment, Crete argued that the
termination was based on the fact that Jarvela no longer met the
requirements set out in the job description for his commercial motor
vehicle driver position, which required him to qualify under Department
of Transportation (DOT) regulations.o' Under DOT regulations, a
driver with a "current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism" was forbidden
from obtaining or maintaining a motor carrier permit and did not meet
the physical qualifications standards for the position." 0
Jarvela
argued that after he completed his treatment program for alcohol
dependence, he was no longer suffering from a clinical diagnosis of
alcoholism."' However, the district court disagreed and the court of
appeals affirmed that a mere seven days after a diagnosis is still
considered current." 2 Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
since Jarvela could not qualify for the job of commercial motor vehicle
driver, he was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA and the
district court properly granted summary judgment on Jarvela's ADA
claim."'
For Jarvela's FMLA claims, he asserted that Crete violated both the
interference and retaliation provisions of the FMLA by not returning
him to his former job or an equivalent position following his companyapproved leave."' The court noted that "[a]n employee has the right
following FMLA leave 'to be restored by the employer to the position of
employment held by the employee when the leave commenced' or to an
equivalent position.""' However, the court also acknowledged that "an
employer can deny reinstatement following FMLA leave if it can
demonstrate that it would have discharged the employee even if he had
not been on FMLA leave."" 6 The district court found there was ample,
unrebutted evidence in the record to indicate that Crete would have
discharged Jarvela upon learning of his diagnosis of alcohol dependence

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

829.
826.
830.
830-31.
831.
831-32.
831 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(A) (2012)).
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed
regardless of whether he took leave."'
with the district court's determination and also held that Jarvela's
interference claim failed. 118
As for the retaliation claim, Jarvela also failed to establish a prima
facie case." 9 To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under
FMLA, an employee must show the following: "(1) he engaged in
statutorily protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment
decision, and (3) the decision was causally related to the protected
activity."1 20 The district court concluded, and the Eleventh Circuit
panel agreed, that Jarvela could not prove Crete's decision to terminate
him was causally related to his FMLA leave.' 2 ' Specifically, the court
stated that Coulter, the Vice President who terminated Jarvela, did not
know Jarvela was out on FMLA leave when he made the decision to
terminate him.1 22 Jarvela did not present any evidence to dispute this
fact.1 23 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit determined the district
court properly granted summary judgment to Crete on Jarvela's
retaliation claim and each of his other claims.' 2 4
V.

FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

In Hawkins v. BBVA Compass Bancshares, Inc.,12 the Eleventh
Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of BBVA Compass Bancshares.1 26 Hawkins, a female financial analyst, brought both Title VII and FMLA
claims against her employer after her employment was terminated on
September 12, 2012.127
From early in Hawkins' employment, her immediate supervisor,
Arauz, and her co-worker, Love, perceived that Hawkins struggled to
accurately, efficiently, and timely complete her job duties. Hawkins
received a verbal warning in December 2011 and a written warning in
May 2012. After each of these warnings, Hawkins complained to Human
Resources that Arauz was "harsh," used foul language, and was not
giving her enough direction. In August 2012, Hawkins was placed on a

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 832.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
613 F. App'x 831 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 835.
Id.
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ninety-day probation period because of her poor performance, and she
again complained to Human Resources. This time, Hawkins alleged that
the warning was retaliatory in response to her prior complaints about
her supervisor. Immediately, she was placed on probation and left on
non-FMLA leave. Subsequently, Hawkins completed her twelve-month
period to be eligible for FMLA leave, which was approved for August 15,
2012 through September 30, 2012. During this time, her assignment
was reviewed for accuracy and, through an independent analysis, it was
determined that it was riddled with errors. 1 28
When Hawkins returned from her FMLA leave, her doctor ordered her
to only work half-days for two weeks and then resume full duty. The
day she returned to work, she was informed that she had been terminated because of her unsatisfactory performance. Two male employees
replaced her. Subsequently, Hawkins filed claims for sex discrimination
under Title VII and retaliation and interference claims under FMLA.1 2 9
The Eleventh Circuit held the district court's grant of summary
judgment on all claims was proper.13 0 With regard to Hawkins' Title
VII disparate treatment claim based on gender, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that the only adverse action it could
consider was Hawkins' termination of employment.'' The district
court assumed that Hawkins had established a prima facie case for
discrimination, but found that the employer established a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Hawkins-her ongoing poor performance. 3 2 Moreover, both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit
determined that Hawkins failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext
to survive summary judgment.3 3 Hawkins pointed to certain facts
that she claimed established pretext, including (1) Arauz referred to
female co-workers as "bitches" on five to six occasions and once called
Hawkins a bitch behind her back; and (2) Arauz once told Hawkins that
she had "mommy brain."' 3 4 While the Eleventh Circuit referred to
these comments as inappropriate and offensive, it concluded, under the
totality of the circumstances, this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the employer's reason for terminating Hawkins' employment was
a pretext for gender discrimination. '
The Eleventh Circuit also

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

833, 834, 835.
835.
841.
835.
836.
837.
838.

2016]

LABOR & EMPLOYMENT

969

determined Hawkins' Title VII retaliation claim failed for the same
reason that her disparate treatment claims did-her failure to provide
evidence that the employer's stated reasons for its actions were a mere
pretext for illegal retaliation.13 6
In considering Hawkins' FMLA retaliation and interference claims, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that the district court properly granted summary
judgment to the employer.' The plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim
failed for the same reason as her Title VII claims.'
Even assuming
the plaintiff established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, the
employer presented a legitimate reason for her termination, and
Hawkins failed to show it was pretextual. 39 With respect to the
plaintiff's FMLA interference claim, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish an
interference claim because it was undisputed that the employer would
have terminated Hawkins regardless of any FMLA leave she took or
requested.' 4 0
In Skotnicki v. Board of 7hustees of the University of Alabama,14 ' the
Eleventh Circuit, in another per curiam opinion, affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees of
the University of Alabama and held the FMLA does not apply after an
employer terminates the temporary employee.' 4 2 Skotnicki, a former
nurse at the University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital (UAB),
alleged UAB violated federal and state law when it denied her request
for medical leave, which would have begun after her employment
ended."4

Skotnicki, who began working at UAB as a staff nurse in November
1998, changed her employment status from full-time to part-time in 2002
because of a neurological condition that could affect her gait and
balance. In 2007, Skotnicki took a one-month leave of absence under the
FMLA to seek necessary medical treatment. When she returned to
work, Skotnicki elected a temporary job that was less physically
demanding, acknowledging it was a temporary position and would
remain available only until UAB hired a full-time nurse practitioner.'"
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In 2009, Skotnicki fell at her home and became unable to walk
without assistance. About that time, she learned UAB was permanently
filling her position with a nurse practitioner and, as a result, her
temporary position would end. Skotnicki then applied for medical leave
to receive treatment that would hopefully enable her to return to work.
In the meantime, UAB hired a nurse practitioner and told Skotnicki her
last day would be April 2, 2010. UAB denied her requested medical
leave because it would have begun after her employment ended. Once
Skotnicki was terminated, she filed a claim under the FMLA for
retaliation and interference.145
The district court granted summary judgment in UAB's favor. The
district court reasoned that because UAB decided to terminate her before
she engaged in any protected activity, and her leave would have begun
after her employment terminated, Skotnicki was not covered by the
FMLA."' The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding "the FMLA does
not give a terminated employee the right to commence medical leave
after her last day of employment, when she is no longer covered by the
Act."1 47

VI.

SECTION 1981

In Fortson v. Carlson,148 the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam
opinion, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Columbia Farms of Georgia and three members of its management
team in a case in which a former employee, Fortson, claimed he was
subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Section
1981149 and Title VII. Fortson, an African-American male, was a
delivery dispatcher for truckers of a feed mill. Fortson claimed to have
suffered harassing incidents a total of twelve times over two and a half
years at the hands of the mostly Caucasian truckers. Based on the
summary judgment record, which was viewed in the light most favorable
to Fortson, the drivers of the trucks would call him "black ass" and
"black ass fool" when he did not have their route ready or if they did not
get the route they wanted. Fortson ultimately was terminated for
sleeping on the job. In his complaint, Fortson claimed he was subject to
a racially hostile work environment in violation of § 1981 and Title
50
VII.o
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The district court dismissed Fortson's Title VII claims as untimely
because he filed his EEOC charge more than 180 days after the adverse
employment action, his termination. Also, the district court granted
summary judgment for defendants on the § 1981 hostile work environment claim.1 "' The Eleventh Circuit listed the five elements plaintiffs
must prove to establish a prima facie case for a racially hostile work
environment:
(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he has been the subject of
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his race; (4)
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of employment and create a discriminatory abusive
working environment; and (5) the employer was responsible for such
environment under a theory of vicarious or direct liability.5 2
The district court found, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, that
Fortson's claim failed on the fourth element because he failed to
demonstrate the harassing behavior was sufficiently severe and
pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a
discriminatory abusive working environment.'
Additionally, the
court held Fortson did not experience any adverse employment actions
because of the harassment.' 5 ' Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit held the
district court properly granted summary judgment.'55
In Dysart v. Palms of PasadenaHospital, LP," Dysart, an AfricanAmerican nurse, was told she could not treat a patient after the family
of such patient asked that the patient not be treated by any African
Americans. The hospital reasoned that the Caucasian patient was a
victim of a mugging by an African-American male and would become
upset when she saw dark-skinned individuals.'
The hospital contended variously that the patient "made a 'no blacks' demand, that [the
patient's] daughter made the request, and/or that the Hospital determined on its own" that it was in the best interest of the patient for
Dysart not to care for her.' 8 Subsequently, Dysart filed a claim of
race discrimination under § 1981."'
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The district court ordered partial summary judgment on behalf of the
plaintiff and denied summary judgment for the defendant, the hospital.1 6 0 In the decision, the court cited Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc.,161
the leading case on race-matching in the Eleventh Circuit. 6 2 Under
Ferrill, direct evidence of race-matching without rebuttal can establish
a prima facie case for a § 1981 claim.1 63 In Ferrill, the hospital
rebutted the evidence of race-matching with the fact that it does not
have a proclaimed policy on race-matching.'6 ' The court not only
rejected that defense, but found that the uncontroverted record revealed
the decision to prohibit African Americans and dark-complexioned staff
members from participating in the patient's care was approved all the
way up the chain of command and was, in fact, a policy.1 65 The second
defense asserted by the hospital was that the decision was based on the
needs of the patient or the request of the patient. 1 6 6 The court also
rejected this defense because it is not relevant.'"' The court pointed
out that the hospital tried to provide a "legitimate, discriminatory
reason" for the conduct, but that reason is not relevant because
legitimate discriminatory reasons are not recognized as a defense.'
The district court held that all of the defenses failed and the hospital in
fact discriminated against Dysart because "but for Plaintiff's race she
The court found
would have been allowed to treat Patient X.""'
summary judgment was properly granted on this issue. 7 o Finally, the
court also concluded the issues of whether the hospital's actions were
materially adverse and the extent of Dysart's damages must go to the
jury.1
VII.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

In Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, PA.,"' the Eleventh Circuit
reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer,
abandoned the Department of Labor's (DOL) test on whether trainees
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and interns are "employees" under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), 7 and remanded the case to the district court to apply a
different test.1 1 4 In this case, twenty-five former nurse anesthetist
students satisfied their clinical program requirements at Collier
Anesthesia. The students claimed they were "employees" under the
FLSA during their clinical internship work and should be paid minimum
wage and overtime as required by the Act. The district court granted
summary judgment for the employer, finding that the students were not
employees under the FLSA and, therefore, were not entitled to minimum
wage or overtime pay.17
The district court concluded the students were not employees under a
DOL six-part test used to determine whether or not trainees and interns
should be considered employees under the FLSA.17 6
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment and remanded the case for rehearing under the new test for
"employees.""
The DOL's test is taken from Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 7
a seminal Supreme Court case."' Portland Terminal involved a
railroad company that offered a developmental program for yard
brakemen. A person who wished to become a brakeman was required to
complete the course to be considered for a position at the railroad, which
was not guaranteed. This training program was designed to allow the
trainees to do work under the supervision of regular employees but did
not displace any regular employees.' The Supreme Court held these
trainees were not employees under the FLSA because the railroad was
providing instruction that "would most greatly benefit the trainees."s'
The Eleventh Circuit held the six-part test the DOL derived from
Portland Terminal was not a regulation and did not arise as a result of
rule-making or an adversarial process.' 82 Therefore, the DOL test was,
at best, entitled to Skidmore'" deference, meaning deference propor84
tional to its power to persuade.1
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In Schumann, the court held the test deserved no deference.' The
court stated, "[Wiith all due respect to the Department of Labor, it has
no more expertise in construing a Supreme Court case than does the
Judiciary." 8 6 It instead cited a recent United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decision, Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc.,s as applying the appropriate factors of the primary beneficiary
test in today's society. 188 The Second Circuit determined that the
situations described in Portland Terminal were outdated and not
relevant to the workplace today.'
In an attempt to balance the
benefit to the students in hands-on internships and the potential for
employers to take advantage of that opportunity, the Second Circuit
enumerated seven factors that should be weighed by the court. 90 The
factors are the following: (1) The employer and intern are on the same
page regarding compensation; (2) training is similar to the classroom
environment; (3) there is a connection between the employer and the
educational program; (4) if the internship is for academic credit; (5) the
duration of the internship; (6) whether an internship replaces a regular
employee's work; and (7) whether an intern is entitled to paid work at
the end of the internship. 9 1 The Eleventh Circuit adopted these
factors in an attempt to "ascertain the primary beneficiary" of a trainee
or intern relationship.' 92 The Eleventh Circuit overturned the grant
of summary judgment and remanded the case to be determined under
these factors. 19
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